Commentary: PM Ishiba’s grand vision for Japan defence finds little support, even at home

PERTH: Just days after taking office, Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba already appears to be on the defensive.
In his first policy speech to parliament on Oct 4, and certainly with an eye on the snap election on Oct 27, there was no explicit mention of the “Asian version of NATO” he had advocated nor some of the more divisive proposals he made in the lead-up to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s presidential election.
Besides the idea of a collective defence system, his ideas to “ensure deterrence against the nuclear alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea” included considering nuclear sharing with the United States. making the US-Japan alliance more equal, and even deploying the Japan military to US territory Guam.
Call it showing restraint in pushing his personal agenda or backpedalling in the face of scepticism, the new prime minister has good reason to take a cautious approach to national security issues.
Given his weak support within the party, he is likely to avoid stirring further internal division and focus on strengthening his mandate in the general election.
The creation of an Asian NATO has long been one of Mr Ishiba’s key arguments in the field of national security, a topic in which he excels. But bringing it to fruition will require party support and significant political capital to negotiate with reluctant countries – both of which he does not have.
Already, some LDP senior members have expressed their opposition to the idea. The LDP has also approved its campaign platform for the upcoming election, which omits mention of the creation of an Asian NATO.
Given the completely different geographic and historical contexts of Asia, the United States have established a “hub-and-spokes” alliance system or a series of bilateral security alliances in Asia. It is hard to imagine a framework, similar to the NATO collective defence system, being formed here in the diverse region.
It is unrealistic to expect Asian countries to explicitly choose sides against China as a “common threat,” especially considering many have close economic ties with it.
Mr Ishiba will also face opposition from the US on other fronts from the get-go, if he takes his predecessor Fumio Kishida’s work in beefing up the US-Japan alliance one step further. It might be one step too far for Washington’s liking.
He advocates for revising the “asymmetry” in the US-Japan Security Treaty to make the alliance more balanced and for Japan to participate in the decision-making process regarding the use of US nuclear weapons through “nuclear sharing”.
He also proposes revising the Status of Forces Agreement, which grants privileged status to US forces stationed in Japan, but Washington has consistently opposed such revisions. The most controversial special status is exemption from Japanese laws.
It remains unclear what specific changes Mr Ishiba aims to achieve.
Japan’s legal framework restricts its role in collective self-defence, a crucial factor for joining any military alliance. In the past, even the partial approval of this sparked significant public debate, and the nation remains divided on expanding these powers.
Nuclear sharing is another thorny issue which has raised concerns about the collapse of Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”: Not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing nuclear weapons, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the country.
In Mr Ishiba’s view, nuclear sharing would not violate its non-nuclear principles since it pertains to Japan sharing in the decisionmaking process but not possessing nor controlling nuclear weapons.
The idea of nuclear sharing is not new and it is one area where Mr Ishiba might have more support from fellow lawmakers. Japan is grappling with the dilemma on relying on US nuclear deterrence while holding on to its vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
It was initially proposed by former prime minister Shinzo Abe and supported by conservative lawmakers like Mr Ishiba’s main LDP challenger Sanae Takaichi whom he pipped to the post. Mr Kishida, who hails from Hiroshima, was against the idea.
If Mr Ishiba’s administration pushes these discussions forward, the pushback will come from the public. Concerns are growing in Nagasaki, a city affected by the atomic bomb, and in Okinawa, which hosts a concentration of US military bases. Local voices fear that this could lead to the collapse of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and increase the burden of military bases.
Both party members and experts have raised doubts about the feasibility of these ideas. And national security has taken a backseat as election campaigning hits full swing and domestic issues like high prices and political funding reforms come to the fore.
Nonetheless, the lineup of ministers and senior officials in the Ishiba administration paints a longer-term picture, notably in the number of individuals with experience as defence ministers: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, Chairman of the Policy Research Council Itsunori Onodera, and Mr Ishiba himself have all previously held the position.
This team can be seen as an effort to place seasoned veterans knowledgeable in security policy in key positions, demonstrating a commitment to future initiatives as Japan’s security environment deteriorates rapidly.
Mr Ishiba has called the current security environment “the most severe since the end of World War II”. With his defence minister credentials and his deep expertise in security issues, there will be an expectation for him to put forward concrete and feasible policies that strengthen Japan’s defense capabilities, including its deterrence, rather than relying on abstract ideas.
Dr Yasuo Takao is Adjunct Senior Research Fellow of Political Science at Curtin University.